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Feticide:
Murder in Kentucky?
INTRODUCTION
A man brutally assaults his estranged wife, eight months preg-
nant, by kicking her repeatedly in the abdomen. During this
assault, he declares that he is going to "stomp" the baby out of
her.' The unborn child would have had a ninety-nine percent
chance of survival in the event of a premature birth at the time
of the assault.2 Instead, the fetus is subsequently delivered
stillborn with a fractured skull.
Ignoring the legal ramifications of the assault on the woman,
has this man committed murder as defined in the murder statute?
Phrasing this question another way, is an unborn viable fetus a
"person" within the meaning of the murder statute?
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, in Hollis v. Common-
wealth,3 recently decided that an unborn viable fetus is not a
"person" within the meaning of Kentucky's murder statute.4
Because this decision is consistent with all other American jurisdic-
tions, it cannot be considered a landmark case. However, this rul-
I The fact situation described is based on Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617,
618 (Cal. 1970). See note 54 infra for a detailed account of the facts in Keeler.
2 See People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d 775, 778 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). The court
stated:
[B]irth itself is no longer a violent, perilous adventure. Current statistics
indicate that the fetal survival rate after twenty weeks of gestation is ninety-
nine percent (99%).... This compares with an infant survival rate of
98.5%. Thus, after five months of pregnancy, survival is virtually certain,
or at least as certain as survival through the first postnatal year.
Id.
3 Holis v. Commonwealth, 30 Ky. L. SuMm. 4, at 7 (Ky. Mar. 31, 1983).
[hereinafter cited as KLS].
4 Ky. Ruv. STAT. § 507.020 (Bobbs-Merrill Cum. Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
KRS]. The pertinent part of KRS § 507.020 reads:
(1) A person is guilty of murder when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death
of such a person or of a third person.., or
(b) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life,
he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person and thereby causes the death of another person.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ing is in direct conflict with the view of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals' and with the views of two members of the Kentucky
Supreme Court,6 who have indicated their belief that a fetus is
a "person" and therefore entitled to the protection of the murder
statute.
This Comment examines the current legal status of feticide
in Kentucky. It discusses why the Supreme Court was correct in
denying a fetus protection under the current murder statute, as
well as the perceived flaws in the court of appeals' attempt to define
a fetus as a "person" under the current statute. Finally, this Com-
ment proposes that the murder statute be revised to include
feticide.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Throughout history, there has been confusion regarding the
legal implications of killing an unborn child. s Ancient law fluc-
tuated between two extremes-from protecting a quickened
fetus9 to allowing a mother to kill her child, even after birth.'0
This wide divergence in the law was caused by factors such as
convenience, the potential for a fetus to become a worker or a
warrior, medical knowledge (or the lack thereof), and religious
and moral beliefs."
Early English common law attached significance to fetal
quickening when considering the legal implication of feticide.12
However, by the mid-nineteenth century, common law shifted
5 See Hollis v. Commonwealth, 29 KLS 6, at 7 (Ky. Ct. App. May 26, 1982) rev'd,
30 KLS 4, at 7 (Ky. Mar. 31, 1983).
6 Hollis v. Commonwealth, 30 KLS 4, at 7 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (Chief
Justice Stevens joined in the dissent).
7 Feticide must be distinguished from infanticide. Feticide is the destruction of the
fetus in the womb, while infanticide is the murder or killing of an infant soon after its
birth. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 559, 699 (5th ed. 1979).
8 See Comment, The Non-Consensual Killing of an Unborn Infant: A Criminal
Act?, 20 BUFFALO L. REv. 535 (1971).
9 "Quickening" is defined as "the first motion of the fetus in the womb felt by the
mother, occurring usually about the middle of... pregnancy." BLACKs LAW DIcIONARY
1122 (5th ed. 1979).
10 See Comment, supra note 8, at 536.
11 See id. at 535-36.
12 Id. at 536.
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to the "born alive" theory. n Under this theory, a child must be
born alive in order to be afforded protection under a homicide
statute.14 The "born alive" doctrine prevailed in England until
passage of the Infanticide Acts of 1922 and 1938.15
American courts employed the "born alive" doctrine as ear-
ly as 1797 in infanticide cases. 16 By 1850, this rule of English
common law had become accepted and "well settled" in American
case law. 7
American jurisdictions have several variations of the "born
alive" theory. Most states use the "independent circulation of
blood" test,18 which requires the baby to be completely out of the
mother's womb and, in some cases, to have the umbilical cord
severed. 19 However, other states have concluded that respiration
is determinative of independent existence.2 Kentucky courts re-
quire both respiration and the completed birth process to sustain
a conviction for murder.21 In contrast, California common law
13 Id. The court in Keeler stated:
Perhaps the most influential statement of the "born alive" rule is that of Coke,
in mid-17th century: "If a woman be quick with childe, and. . . if a man
beat her, whereby the childe dyeth in her body, and she is delivered of a
dead childe, this is a great misprision [i.e., misdemeanor], and no murder;
but if the childe be born alive and dyeth of ... battery, or other cause, this
is murder; for in the law it is accounted a reasonable creature, in rerum
natura, when it is born alive."
470 P.2d at 620 (citation omitted).
14 Comment, supra note 8, at 536.
15 Meldman, Legal Concepts of Human Life: The Infanticide Doctrines, 52 MARQ.
L. REV. 105, 107 (1968). Under these Acts, a mother who killed her child under the age
of 12 months would be guilty of only manslaughter if, at the time of the killing, the mother
was mentally unbalanced because she had not fully recovered from the effect of giving
birth. These laws were more in keeping with popular sentiment, as they provided a way
to find a mother guilty of infanticide without inflicting capital punishment, which was
generally thought to be too severe. See id. at 108.
16 Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 p.2d at 621.
17 Id.
18 Comment, The Killing of a Viable Fetus Is Murder, 30 MD. L. REv. 137, 139
(1970).
19 Id.
20 Id. The post-mortem examination usually included a "hydrostatic test," in which
the infant's lungs were placed in water. If they floated, then respiration was assumed to
have transpired. Unfortunately, decomposition also produces gases which would cause
the lung to float. Thus, the "hydrostatic test" (and correspondingly, the "respiration test")
was, at best, a rough test of live birth. See Meldman, supra note 15, at 109.
21 Jackson v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.2d 1014 (Ky. 1936).
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required only that the child be in the process of birth to be pro-
tected under its homicide statute.22
English and American courts adopted the "born alive" theory
for several reasons. First, at the time the courts adopted the theory,
medical science was relatively crude, resulting in high pre-natal
mortality rates. Thus, the presumption was that the fetus would
not be born alive - Second, it was believed that a mother did
not act rationally during the process of birth. She was considered
to be "capable of destroying the fetus through irrational conduct
and would be excused by the criminal law."24 Finally, it was dif-
ficult to determine the cause of the infant's death, again due to
lack of medical and scientific knowledge.25
Today, however, the rationale supporting the "born alive"
doctrine is no longer valid in feticide cases, especially when the
fetus is killed as a result of an assault on the fetus' mother. Medical
science has progressed to the point that the presumption must be
that a viable fetus will be born alive.26 Also, the mother's men-
tal condition is irrelevant when the fetus is killed as a result of
a non-consensual assault upon her. Finally, medical and scien-
tific advances have minimized evidentiary problems in determining
the fetus' cause of death.27
II. HOLLIS V. COMMONWEALTH
The requirement that a murder victim be "born alive" in order
to sustain a prosecution for infanticide was enunciated in Ken-
tucky in the case of Jackson v. Commonwealth,28 in which a
mother was convicted of murder for the strangulation death of
her newborn infant.2 However, whether an unborn viable fetus
2 People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947).
23 Comment, supra note 8, at 536.
24 Id. at 537.25
Id.
26 See note 2 supra.
27 See note 35 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of medical and scientific
advances since the Jackson decision in 1936.
2 96 S.W.2d at 1014.
2 The Court held:
It is true that, "in order to establish the corpus delicti, in a case of infan-
ticide, it must be established that the child was born alive. In the absence
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is a "person" within the meaning of Kentucky's murder statute
is a question which had not been directly addressed by Kentucky
courts prior to the Hollis decision.
Robert Hollis was charged with murdering the unborn child
of his estranged wife.3 The Commonwealth alleged that Hollis:
came to the home of the parents of his estranged wife and told
his wife that he did not want her to have the baby, then took
her out into the barn and put his hand up into her vagina, caus-
ing the womb of the child's mother to split and the child to be
forced into the mother's abdomen.3'
The child died as a result of this trauma and had to be surgically
removed.32
The trial court held that an unborn viable fetus was not a
"person" under the murder statute and dismissed the
indictment.3 On appeal by the Commonwealth, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals reversed this decision and remanded the case
to the trial court. The appellate court believed that "Jackson was
based upon outmoded principles and should not be controlling"
in Hollis.3 The court of appeals based its decision on several fac-
tors: 1) the progress of medical science since Jackson;-I 2) the tort
of proof that the child had ever breathed or was alive at birth a conviction
can not [sic] be sustained. It is necessary for the Commonwealth to prove
affirmatively, not only that the child had breathed, because that might oc-
cur during birth, but that it had had a complete and separate existence of
its own after birth. Being born means that the whole body is brought into
the world, and it is not sufficient that the child breathes in the progress of
the birth. But if a child is fully brought forth from the body of its mother,
and is killed while still connected by the umbilical cord, it is murder. When
the evidence that the child was born alive is susceptible of doubt, a convic-
tion can not [sic] be sustained."
Id. at 563 (quoting J. ROBERSON, ROBERSON's NE W KENTUCKY CRIMINAL LAW AND PRO-
CEDURE § 425 (2d ed. 1927)).
30 Hollis v. Commonwealth, 29 KLS 6, at 7.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 8.
35 The court of appeals believed that in light of the progress in medical science since
Jackson, the jury should decide from the scientific evidence presented whether the un-
born Hollis child was a "person." 29 KLS 6, at 7. The court stated:
FE~iCID
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law allowing recovery of damages for the wrongful death of a
viable fetus;36 and 3) the belief that the judiciary can interpret
We believe that medical science has progressed tremendously since Jackson
was decided in 1936. Many diseases, genetic and otherwise, and injuries to
a fetus, can be diagnosed while~he fetus is in the womb. Doctors can make
a prognosis and proscribe [sic] treatment for sick and injured unborn infants
with the aid of modern medical science. For these medical reasons... we
conclude that ... Jackson... should not be controlling in the case at bar.
Id. at 8.
Most American courts which have considered this issue have acknowledged the pro-
gress of science since the creation of the "born alive" doctrine and have found the "born
alive" rule to be an archaic legal fiction which no longer serves a legitimate objective.
See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d at 624; People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d at
778; State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d 599, 602 (Ohio 1971). The rule originated because
of the common law's presumption that a fetus would not be born alive. See Comment,
supra note 8, for a discussion of the common law presumption that a fetus would not be
born alive. Now that medical science provides a high probability that a viable fetus will
be born alive (see 293 N.W.2d at 778 for a court's use of statistical support for a presump-
tion of survival) the "born alive" rule is no longer needed.
36 29 KLS 6, at 8. The court of appeals in Hollis noted:
In the Commonwealth of Kentucky, it has long been recognized that an un-
born fetus has certain rights because the courts of Kentucky... have general-
ly recognized the unborn infant's right of action for the loss or injury of one
or both of its parents under the death statute, and workers compensation
act. Kentucky addressed this issue in permitting recovery in damages for the
wrongful death of a viable fetus.
Id. (citing Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. 1955)).
In Mitchell, Kentucky's highest court held that an unborn fetus was a person within
the meaning of the wrongful death statute and allowed recovery in damages for the fetus'
death. The Court in Mitchell stated:
The most cogent reason, we believe, for holding that a viable unborn child
is an entity within the meaning of the general word "person' is because,
biologically speaking, such a child is, in fact, a presently existing person,
a living human being .... [W]e conclude that when a pregnant woman is
injured through negligence and the child, if it be a viable infant . . suf-
fers death as a consequence, a right of recovery exists....
Id. at 905-06. Most jurisdictions now permit the recovery of damages for the wrongful
death of an unborn child. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 55 (4th
ed. 1971). However, the court of appeals decision in Hollis is unique in that the court
extended the tort law concept that a fetus is a person into the criminal law. See e.g., Peo-
ple v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d 203, 207-08 (11. 1980) (acknowledging the merit of the tort argu-
ment, but not concurring in the extension); People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d at 778
(acknowledging recovery for the wrongful death of a viable fetus, but rejecting such an
extension into thq criminal law). The court of appeals in Hollis stated: "If an unborn viable
fetus is a person for the purposes... [of tort law], we cannot perceive any sound reason
why it should have any less status when it has become an alleged murder victim." 29 KLS
6, at 8.
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the meaning of the word "person" in the murder statute, absent
specific legislative definition.37
On appeal by Hollis, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed
the court of appeals.8 The Supreme Court based its decision on
three factors: 1) the common law definition of murder; 2) the im-
pact of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade 9 on Hollis; and 3) the use of recognized rules of statutory
construction. 40
The Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the argument of the
Commonwealth that a fetus should be accorded the status of a
"person" for purposes of the law of criminal homicide.41
Although this argument appealed to the Supreme Court the justices
felt constrained by prior case law.4 The Court noted that nine-
teen other states had specifically upheld the "born alive" doctrine
and that no jurisdiction had invalidated this doctrine. 43
The Court then looked to the impact of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade on the Hollis case. The
Court held that Roe v. Wade is not authority for the proposition
that a viable fetus is a "person" within the meaning of the murder
statute. Rather, the meaning of Roe v. Wade is just the opposite-
"that no state can prohibit terminating the life of a fetus... un-
til the final trimester of pregnancy, and not even then when
necessary to protect maternal life or health."44
7 29 KLS 6, at 8. The court of appeals in Hollis stated: "We do not believe... we
are in a position of legislating or usurping the function of the Legislature. We are inter-
preting the meaning of the word 'person' and we feel free to utilize existing case law and
other matters pertinent thereto in arriving at this decision." Id. (relying on McCord v.
Pineway Farms, 569 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978)). See note 79 infra for the text of
McCord as cited in the court of appeals 'decision.
8 Hollis v. Commonwealth, 30 KLS 4, at 7.
39 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
40 30 KLS 4, at 7.
41 Id. at 8. This argument had been accepted by the court of appeals. 29 KLS 6, at 8.
42Id.
43 Id. at 8.
44 Id. The Supreme Court further stated:
[U]nder Roe, Kentucky has the right to regulate the manner in which abor-
tions shall be performed in the second trimester of pregnancy. To declare
that it has done so by the murder statute, KRS 507.020, is totally inconsis-
tent with any rational interpretation of that statute. The statute makes no
effort to define the word "person," leading to only one conclusion, that it
1982-83]
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Finally, the Kentucky Supreme Court looked to rules of
statutory construction to aid in its interpretation of the murder
statute. The Court rejected the use of tort law to aid in the inter-
pretation of a criminal statute.4 Instead, the Court relied on the
Model Penal Code and decided that the murder statute only ap-
plied when the victim was "born alive."46 Further, the Court
seemed concerned that an interpretation that would include a fetus
as a person would be void for vagueness due to the uncertainty
inherent in the determination of viability.47 Also, "a finding that
a viable fetus should be considered a 'person' [under the murder
statute], runs afoul of the well-recognized rule of statutory con-
struction that 'the specific statute controls a more general stat-
ute.' "48 Thus, the specific statute of abortion controls the more
general murder statute.49
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S RATIONALE IS CORRECT
The brutal killing of a near-term fetus under circumstances
like those in Hollis is a horrible event. The facts of Hollis clearly
should be interpreted in conformity with the law regarding criminal homicide
as it existed at the time when the statute was passed. We have already discuss-
ed what that law is Jackson v. Commonwealth.
Id.
45 Id. "In this state, where criminal sanctions are supposed to flow from the Ken-
tucky Penal Code rather than evolving out of court decisions, it would be fundamental
error to create a crime in the absence of a statute based on destroying the life of a viable
fetus." Id.
46 Id. The court relied on the commentary to the Model Penal Code which states:
The effect of this language is to continue the common-law rule limiting
criminal homicide to the killing of one who has been born alive. Several
modem statutes follow the Model Code in making this limitation explicit.
Others are silent on the point, but absent express statement to the contrary,
they too may be expected to carry forward the common-law approach.
Id. See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1(1) at 11 (Official Draft and Revised Comments
1980) [hereinafter cited as MPC].
47 Hollis v. Commonwealth, 30 KLS 4, at 9. The Court stated:
In the present situation, if we were to declare that a viable fetus should be
considered a "person" for purposes of the criminal homicide statutes, our
decision would be unconstitutionally vague unless we set some objective legal
standard for deciding if the accused knew he was terminating the life of a
viable fetus.
Id.
48 Id. (citing Heady v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1980)).
49 Id.
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demand that the killer be tried for murder, but such a trial is not
proper under Kentucky's current murder statute5 because the
statute does not define an unborn viable fetus as a "person," and
Kentucky's courts are not free to infer such a definition from the
law. For these reasons, the rationale supporting the Supreme
Court's decision in Hollis is correct.
A. Due Process Considerations
The Supreme Court's decision in Hollis is consistent with the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution. 51 An essential element of due process is that
a state's criminal law must give fair warning that certain actions
are punishable as a crime. 52 In the famous case of Keeler v.
Superior Court,O a man was tried in California for the murder
of an unborn child. Keeler's facts 54 are similar to those in Hollis.
The court in Keeler, although acknowledging medical science's
advances in obstetrics and pediatrics since the adoption of the "born
alive" rule, refused to find an unborn viable fetus a "human be-
50 KRS § 507.020 (Cum. Supp. 1982). See note 4 supra for the pertinent text of this
statute.
51 See U. S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1.52 See Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d at 626, where the court refused to allow
a trial for murder because the statute failed to give fair warning. This "fair warning" re-
quirement of due process also ensures that a court cannot arbitrarily convict a person for
violating a law that is not on the books. See notes 75-84 infra and accompanying text for
a discussion of the inadvisability of judicial legislation.
53 470 P.2d at 617.
54 In Keeler, the court found the facts to be as follows:
Mrs. Keeler was driving on a narrow mountain road in Amador County after
delivering the girls to their home. She met petitioner driving in the opposite
direction; he blocked the road with his car, and she pulled over to the side.
He walked to her vehicle and began speaking to her. He seemed calm, and
she rolled down her window to hear him. He said, "I hear you're pregnant.
If you are you had better stay away from the girls and from here." She did
not reply, and he opened the car door; as she later testified, "He assisted
me out of the car ... [I]t wasn't roughly at this time." Petitioner then looked
at her abdomen and became "extremely upset." He said, "You sure are. I'm
going to stomp it out of you." He pushed her against the car, shoved his knee
into her abdomen, and struck her in the face with several blows.
Id. at 618. The fetus, which was 28 to 35 weeks old, was delivered stillborn with a severe-
ly fractured skull. Id.
FETicIDE
KENTucKy LAW JouRNAL
ing" within the meaning of the murder statute.5 The court
found the constitutional requirements of due process to be an in-
surmountable obstacle to sustaining an indictment for murder.
Adopting the language of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the California Supreme Court stated:
That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must
be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is
a well-recognized requirement.... No one may be required at
peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning
of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids.58
Under Kentucky law, a person who kills an unborn viable
fetus, in a situation such as Hollis, does not have sufficient notice
that he or she has committed the crime of murder. Although the
Penal Code gives the killer notice that a lesser crime, such as il-
legal abortion,57 has been committed, the killer cannot fairly be
expected to know that he had murdered a "person."",
B. Legislative Intent
Kentucky's General Assembly apparently did not intend an
unborn fetus to be a "person" within the meaning of the murder
5 Id. at 624.
5 Id. at 626. The court first quoted from Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S.
385, 391 (1926) (a statute which imposed severe penalties on contractors for paying less
than minimum wage was held void for vagueness) and then from Lanzetta v. New Jersy,
306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (a statute which imposed severe penalties for being a "gangster"
was held void for vagueness).
57 KRS § 311.780 (1977) prohibits the abortion of an unborn child after the child
"may reasonably be expected to have reached viability except when necessary to preserve
the health or life of the woman."
'8 For example, even if Robert Hollis had thoroughly researched his alleged assault
prior to its commission, he would not have discovered a jurisdiction that had found a fetus
to be a "person" within the meaning of its murder statute absent a specific feticide provi-
sion. See, e.g., People v. Greer, 402 N.E.2d at 207 (citing 470 P.2d at 617); State v. Brown,
378 So.2d 916 (La. 1979); State v. Dickinson, 275 N.E.2d at 599. See also notes 94-95
infra for examples of homicide statutes which include feticide. If Hollis could not ascer-
tain from previous case law or from the statute itself that his contemplated act would
be murder, then he did not have requisite notice that he would be liable for that crime.
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statute when it enacted the statute in 1974. 59 Although the
murder statute itself does not reveal legislative intent,6o and Ken-
tucky does not maintain an official record of legislative pro-
ceedings, the General Assembly's intent can be inferred from other
sources.
First, the Kentucky Penal Code's murder statute is based
largely on the Model Penal Code (MPC).61 Consequently, the
MPC's murder provision and Kentucky's murder statute have
substantially the same effect.62 The drafters of the MPC defined
a "human being" as "a person who has been born and is alive."m
Thus, a fetus is not a "human being" for the purposes of the MPC's
murder provision. 4 The Kentucky statute, however, circularly
defines a "person" as a "human being" without addressing whether
a fetus is a "person. '" Since Kentucky's murder statute is based
59 Act of June 21, 1974, ch. 406, § 61, 1974 Ky. Acts 843 (codified at KRS § 507.020
(Cum. Supp. 1982)).
60 The term "legislative intent" may imply a more considered motivation than ac-
tually existed. Certainly there was no single intent behind the enactment of Kentucky's
Penal Code. Legislators typically have a variety of personal and political reasons for casting
their votes. Perhaps "legislative intent" is best viewed as the judicial attempt to fill the
interstices of statutory language by viewing the actions of the legislators as a whole.
61 See Lawson, Criminal Law Revision in Kentucky: Part I-Homicide and Assault,
58 KY. L.J. 242 (1969-70)
62 The Model Penal Code defines murder as follows: "Except as provided in Section
210.3(1)(b), criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (a) it is committed purposely
or knowingly; or (b) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life." MPC § 210.2(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently
causes the death of another human being." Id. § 210.1(1) (1962) (emphasis added).
Compare MPC § 210.2(1) (1962) with KRS § 507.020 (Cum. Supp. 1982), the perti-
nent text of which is in note 4 supra. The structure of each of the murder statutes is dif-
ferent, but they are the same in effect. Consequently, the defendant's guilt is based on
his or her mens rea at the time the defendant killed a human being or person.
63 MPC § 210.0(1) (1962).
64 The MPC would treat the killing of an unborn viable fetus, under the cir-
cumstances of Hollis, as an unjustified abortion, a felony of the second degree. See MPC
§ 230.3(1) (1962).
65 KRS § 500.080(12) (Cum. Supp. 1982). Interestingly, Kentucky amended its abor-
tion law in 1982 to define a "human being" as "'any member of the species homo sapiens
from fertilization until death." KRS § 311.720(6) (Interim Supp. 1982). This may indicate
that the legislature is receptive to the inclusion of unborn viable fetuses within the protec-
tion of the murder statute. However, absent specific legislative action to that effect, any
argument that the abortion statute's definition of a "human being" should be applied to
the murder statute is, at best, tenuous. Cf. State v. Brown, 378 So.2d at 917, where the
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
on the MPC, it is reasonable to assume that the Legislature in-
tended to rely on the MPC's concept of a "person" as one who
has been "born alive."
Further, Kentucky's abortion statutes,66 also enacted in
1974,67 suggest that the General Assembly did not intend the
murder statutes to encompass an unborn fetus. Kentucky Revis-
ed Statutes (KRS) section 311.71068 presents the General
Assembly's "official" intent behind enacting the abortion statutes.
The statute provides that "every precaution be taken to insure the
protection of every viable unborn child being aborted, and every
precaution be taken to provide life-supportive procedures to in-
sure an unborn child its continued life after its abortion." 69 A
close reading of this statute suggests that the General Assembly
only desired to protect an aborted fetus after it is actually "born
alive."
KRS section 311.710 further states "there is inadequate legisla-
tion to protect the life, health, and welfare of... unborn human
life."70 This language implies that the legislature gave careful
consideration to the degree of legal protection it desired for an
unborn child. Presumably, the legislature provided this desired
level of legal protection by enacting the 1974 abortion statutes.
Consequently, the legislature's omission of a feticide provision in
the murder statute can be considered intentional.
Finally, the legislative intent to exclude an unborn child from
the murder statute's protection is shown by contrasting the murder
penalty with the illegal abortion penalty. In Kentucky, a murder
conviction carries a minimum penalty of twenty years imprison-
court, in a feticide case, distinguished between the killing of a "human being" and the
killing of a "person." In Brown, the court was confronted with a broadened statutory defini-
tion of "person" which included fetuses but an unchanged murder statute which referred
to the killing of a "human being."
66 Kentucky's abortion law is found in KRS § 311.710-.830 (1983)).
67 Act of June 21, 1974, ch. 255, §§ 1, 5-9, 11-12, 1974 Ky. Acts 484, 484-87 (cur-
rent version at KRS §§ 311.710-.830 (1983)). Kentucky amended part of its abortion law
in 1982. Act of July 15, 1982, ch. 342, §§ 1-7, 9, 11, 1982 Ky. Acts 918, 918-26. However,
the abortion law changes do not affect the murder statute or the conclusions drawn in
this Comment.
68 KRS § 311.710 (1983).
69 KRS § 311.710(1) (emphasis added).
70 KRS § 311.710(2).
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ment and a maximum penalty of death.7'1 In contrast, the penal-
ty for an illegal abortion is as little as two years imprisonment and
the maximum sentence is twenty-one years.72 Such a contrast im-
plies that the General Assembly attached more significance to the
killing of a "person" who was "born alive" than to an unborn fetus.
Practically speaking, murder73 and illegal abortion 4 are in-
distinguishable in their effect upon an unlawfully killed fetus. In
either crime, the killer has intentionally destroyed an unborn child.
Nevertheless, the legislature demonstrated its intent to distinguish
murder from illegal abortion by assigning a greater penalty for
murder. Therefore, until revised, Kentucky's murder statute must
exclude unborn children.
C. Judicial Legislation
Despite the lack of legislative intent to include fetuses within
the meaning of "person" for purposes of the murder statute, the
court of appeals in Hollis decided that it was free to interpret the
murder statute and adopt the opposite position. 75 The court
relied on McCord v. Pineway Farms,76 a civil action involving
the application and interpretation of agricultural zoning statutes,
as authority giving the court license to interpret the meaning of
the term "person" in the murder statute.77
The court's reliance on McCord was misplaced. In McCord,
the Court was concerned with the narrow issue of interpreting
KRS section 100.111(22).78 Cautious of judicial legislation, the
McCord Court examined the legislature's intent in enacting KRS
7' KRS § 532.035 (Cum. Supp. 1982); KRS § 532.060(2)(a)(1975).
72 KRS § 311.990(17) (1983).
73 Murder is defined in KRS § 507.020 (Cum. Supp. 1982).
74 Illegal abortion is defined in KRS § 311.780 (1977).
75 See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of why the court
of appeals in Hollis decided to consider a fetus a "person' within the meaning of the murder
statute.
76 569 S.W.2d 690 (Ky. 1978).
77 See note 37 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of how the appeals court
in Hollis, relying on McCord, justified giving an expansive interpretation to the term
"person."
78 See 569 S.W.2d at 692.
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section 100.111(22) and interpreted the statute accordingly. 79 In
contrast, the court of appeals in Hollis ignored legislative intent.
The court carefully selected that part of the McCord decision which
would enable it to interpret the murder statute.8° Under Ken-
tucky law, all statutes are to be liberally construed with a view
to carry out the intent of the legislature.81 But the court's inter-
pretation of the murder statute without looking to legislative in-
tent was more that mere liberal construction; in reality, it was
judicial legislation.
Judicial legislation, particularly in a case like Hollis, is un-
wise, as many jurisdictions have previously noted.32 In Keeler,
the Supreme Court of California held:
Whether to thus extend liability for murder in California is a
determination solely within the province of the Legislature. For
a court to simply declare, by judicial fiat, that the time has now
come to prosecute under [the murder statute] one who kills an
unborn but viable fetus would indeed be to rewrite the statute
under the guise of construing it.a3
Likewise, in People v. Greer, the Supreme Court of Illinois stated:
"[T]he General Assembly declined to specifically include the un-
born within the potential victims of homicide or to create a
79 The court held:
Certainly, any such judicial activity must be consistent with the reasonably clear
meaning of the statutes, as measured by the constitutional limitations which
may be.involved, however, the interpretation of KRS 100.111(22) is a proper
judicial function. Clearly, the courts should not legislate, but the courts must
interpret. It is necessary for the courts to provide reasonable interpretation of
the language used by the legislature, where a legitimate controversy arises as
to the meaning of the language used, until the legislature can expand its own
definition, it if (sic] so desires.
Id. (emphasis added). The court in Hollis cited only the last sentence of this passage. 29
KLS 6, at 8.
8 See 29 KLS 6, at 8, quoted at note 79 supra.
81 KRS § 446.080(1) (1975). See also Katzman v. Commonwealth, 130 S.W. 990, 992
(Ky. 1910) (holding that Kentucky courts must look to the legislative intent when inter-
preting a criminal statute).
82 See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d at 625-26; People v. Greer, 402
N.E.2d at 209; People v. Guthrie, 293 N.W.2d at 779-80; State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280,
1281 (Utah 1978).
83 470 P.2d at 625-26.
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separate offense of feticide. We cannot alter that decision or create
a new offense." The language of Keeler and Greer illustrate
that the court in Hollis went beyond interpretation of a murder
statute and judicially created a feticide statute.
D. Tort Recognition of the Unborn Child
Kentucky civil law has recognized the unborn infant's right
of action for loss of or injury to its parents under the wrongful
death statute and under the Workers Compensation Act.81 Yet
the civil law's recognition of an unborn viable fetus as a "person"
cannot be transferred to the murder statute solely by judicial
interpolation.
Tort law and criminal law are different because each employs
different means to obtain different objectives. In tort law, the in-
jured party prosecutes the action and seeks compensation for the
injury, regardless of the offending party's actual intent. In the
criminal law, however, the state prosecutes a person on the basis
of the person's mens rea in order to protect the public and punish
the guilty party. Tort law, afforded the luxury of hindsight, may
compensate an injured party even if that party's cause of action
had not previously been recognized. In contrast, criminal law re-
quires the defendant to know, in advance, that certain actions are
prohibited. Ultimately, the most important distinction between
the two types of law lies in the remedy. In tort law, the losing
party usually pays monetary damages. In criminal law, the los-
ing party pays with his or her liberty, or even his or her life. 86
Other jurisdictions have found that recognition of an unborn
child for tort purposes does not translate into similar recognition
under a murder statute.8 ' The court in Greer stated: "American
courts which have extended the benefits of tort law to fetuses have
also, in the absence of specifically inclusive statutory language,
84 402 N.E.2d at 209.
85 Commonwealth v. HoUlis, 29 KIS 6, at 8.
86 See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTr, JR., HANDBOOK ON C xMNAL LAw § 3 (1972)
(presenting a detailed discussion of the differences between tort law and criminal law).
87 See, e.g., Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d at 629-30; People v. Greer, 402
N.E.2d at 208-09; People v. Guthrie 293 N.W.2d at 778; State v. Dickinson 275 N.E.2d
at 602.
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uniformly refused to change the born-alive rule in criminal
cases.. . "I' In People v. Guthrie, the court noted:
It is one thing to mold, change and even reverse established prin-
ciples of common law in civil matters. It is quite another thing
to do so in regard to criminal statutes. ". . . Criminal statutes,
in contrast with the common law, may not be expanded to meet
new problems beyond the contemplation of the Legislature when
the statute was enacted.P
89
Similarly, in State v. Dickinson,90 the Ohio Supreme Court
found "that the definition of a word in a civil statute does not
necessarily import the same meaning to the same word in inter-
preting a criminal statute. The result may be desirable, but
criminal statutes, unlike civil statutes, must be construed strictly
against the state." 9' Thus, the court of appeals in Hollis
mistakenly relied on Kentucky's tort law. The definition of "per-
son" in a civil action should not translate into a criminal law
definition.
IV. THE SOLUTION TO THE HOLLIS DILEMMA
In Hollis, the Kentucky judiciary was "on the horns of dilem-
ma." The judiciary saw the result needed to promote justice in
the case but at the same time was confronted with a murder statute
that did not encompass feticide. In an effort to reach the just result,
the court of appeals ignored the limitations of the current murder
statute and held the killing of an unborn child to be murder.92
However, as the Supreme Court correctly recognized in revers-
88 402 N.E.2d at 208.
89 293 N.W.2d at 778 (citation omitted) (quoting People v. Adams, 192 N.W.2d 19
(Mich. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd in part, 205 N.W.2d 415 (Mich. 1973)).
90 275 N.E.2d 599.
91 Id. at 602.
92 See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale sup-
porting the court of appeals decision in Hollis. See also Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d
at 630-34 (Burke, C.J., dissenting) (the dissent believed that justice required the murder
statute to encompass an unborn viable fetus); Hollis v. Commonwealth, No. 82-SC-634-DG
(Wintersheimer, J., dissenting) (the dissent adopted a position consistent with the court
of appeals decision in Holis).
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ing the court of appeals decision, obstacles of due process,
legislative intent, and the "born alive" rule preclude the court of
appeals approach from being a long-term solution to the question
of whether feticide is murder in Kentucky. 9s The solution to the
problem lies not in judicial interpretation, but in legislative enact-
ment of a revised murder statute which specifically includes
feticide.
Other states, notably California94 and New York,95 have
responded to the injustice of a murder statute which does not en-
compass the killing of an unborn viable fetus by enacting homicide
statutes specifically addressing the issue of feticide. Kentucky
should do the same.
9 See notes 50-91 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the flaws in the
appeals court's rationale.
94 The California legislature revised its murder statutes after the Keeler decision. The
revised statute now provides:
§ 187. Murder defined; death of a fetus
(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or afetus, with malice
aforethought.
(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an act which
results in the death of a fetus if any of the following apply:
(1) The act complied with the [abortion statutes].
(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's and surgeon's cer-
tificate ... in a case where, to a medical certainty, the result of childbirth would
be death of the mother of the fetus or where her death from childbirth, although
not medically certain, would be substantially certain or more likely than not.
(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother
of the fetus.
(4) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of
any person under any other provision of law.
California does not distinguish the murder of a "fetus" from the murder of a "per-
son" when sentencing a defendant found guilty of feticide. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§
189-190.6 (West Supp. 1981).
95 The New York Penal Law, like the MPC, classifies the unlawful killing of an un-
born viable fetus as an unjustified abortion. See note 64 supra for an explanation of the
MPC provision. The following sections of the New York Penal Law are pertinent:
§ 125.00 Homicide defined
Homocide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an un-
born child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four
weeks under circumstances constituting... abortion in the first degree or self-
abortion in the first degree.
§ 125.05 Homicide, abortion and related offenses; definition of terms
(2) "Abortional act" means an act committed upon or with respect to a
female, whether by another person or by the female herself, whether she is preg-
nant or not, . . . with intent to cause a miscarriage of such female.
949 o
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A revision of Kentucky's current murder statute which would
encompass feticide might read:
(1) A person is guilty of murder when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person, or a
viablefetus, he or she causes the death of such a person, or viable
fetus, or of a third person....
(b) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference
to human life, he or she wantonly engages in conduct which
creates a grave risk of death to another person, or to a viable
fetus, and thereby causes the death of another person or viable
fetus.
(2)This section shall not apply to any person who commits
an act which results in the death of a fetus if the act complies
with KRS sections 311.710-.830 (the abortion statutes) or the act
was solicited, aided, or consented to by the mother of the
fetus.9 6
(3) "Justifiable abortional act." An abortional act is justifiable when com-
mitted upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a)
under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within
twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy....
§ 125.45 Abortion in the first degree
A person is guilty of abortion in the first degree when he commits upon
a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which
causes the miscarriage of such a female, unless such abortional act is justifiable
pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Abortion in the first degree is a class D felony.
§ 125.55 Self-abortion in the first degree
A female is guilty of self-abortion in the first degree when, being pregnant
for more than twenty-four weeks, she commits or submits to an abortional act
upon herself which causes her miscarriage, unless such abortional act is justifiable
pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.
Self-abortion in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.00, .05, .45, .55 (McKinney 1975). New York does not equate
unjustifiable abortion with murder. The sentence upon conviction for murder in the first
degree ranges from 15 years to life imprisonment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00(2)(a),
(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1975). In contrast, the penalty for abortion in the first degree is at
most seven years imprisonment. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(2)(d) (McKinney 1975).
96 The author modeled the proposed murder statute after the California murder
statutes. See note 94 supra for the text of the California statutes. The author chose the
California statutes rather than the New York statutes (see note 95 supra for the text of
the New York statutes) because the California approach subjects the intentional killing
of an unborn child to the consequences of murder instead of illegal abortion.
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The legislative enactment of a feticide statute would remove
all of the obstacles previously discussed in this Comment. Any per-
son contemplating feticide would have sufficient notice that the
killing was murder. This would satisfy the due process re-
quirements of the fourteenth amendment. Legislative intent would
be clear and would preclude any need for courts to act as a "super-
legislature." Consequently, Kentucky would fall into line with the
other jurisdictions which have enacted specific legislation in order
to consider feticide to be murder.
CONCLUSION
An unborn viable fetus is not a "person" under Kentucky's
current murder statute. The court of appeals in Hollis, acting to
promote justice in a situation where the current law is unjust, in-
correctly tried to judicially legislate through a contrary interpreta-
tion of the murder statute. The Supreme Court of Kentucky, while
recognizing the inadequacies of the current murder statute, cor-
rectly decided that feticide is not murder in Kentucky. The only
solution to the feticide dilemma lies in the General Assembly's
enactment of a murder statute which encompasses feticide.
Perry Mack Bentley
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